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Abstract
Recent experimental research has examined whether contributions to
public goods can be traced back to intuitive or deliberative decision-
making, using response times in public good games in order to identify the
specific decision process at work. In light of conflicting results, this paper
reports on an analysis of response time data from an online experiment
in which over 3400 subjects from the general population decided whether
to contribute to a real world public good. The between-subjects evidence
confirms a strong positive link between contributing and deliberation and
between free-riding and intuition. The average response time of contribu-
tors is 40 percent higher than that of free-riders. A within-subject analysis
reveals that for a given individual, contributing significantly increases and
free-riding significantly decreases the amount of deliberation required.
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1 Introduction
Despite the opportunity to freeride, some individuals are willing to cooperate in
the private provision of public goods both in economic experiments (Ledyard,
1994; Zelmer, 2003; Chaudhuri, 2011) and in a significant number of real world
situations. This empirical regularity has been ascribed to contributors acting
out of motives such as altruism (Andreoni, 1995), warm glow (Andreoni, 1990)
or reciprocity (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Heterogeneity in these preferences has
been linked to a number of demographic attributes (Andreoni and Vesterlund,
2001; List, 2004), personality traits (Volk et al., 2012) as well as differences
in beliefs (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010). Recent experimental evidence (Pi-
ovesan and Wengstro¨m, 2009; Kocher et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2012; Duffy and
Smith, 2012; Nielsen et al., 2014) suggests that the extent of cooperative be-
havior is additionally influenced by the type of cognitive system that potential
contributors employ when considering their contribution choice. Two principal
types of cognitive systems are distinguished by the reigning ’dual process’ the-
ories of the mind (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue,
2007; Kahneman, 2011): System I, which arrives at decision through affective or
intuitive processes, and System II, which generates decisions based on delibera-
tive or calculated reasoning (Kahneman, 2003; Evans, 2003, 2008; Loewenstein
et al., 2008). These theories, and the experiments associated with them, raise
the possibility that, everything else equal, individuals might come to a differ-
ent contribution choice because their decision relied on intuition (System I) or
deliberation (System II). If confirmed, this would matter for current attempts
to build a unified model of cooperative behavior (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). It
would also provide important clues as to how different decision environments
can make certain public goods provision outcomes more likely than others, de-
pending on whether that environment favors intuition or deliberation (Thaler
et al., 2010).
If contribution decisions are the result of either intuitive or deliberative pro-
cesses, is there empirical evidence that the type of process makes a systematic
difference to contributions? And if so, which of the two cognitive systems, in-
tuition or deliberation, predisposes individuals towards more cooperation? A
number of economic experiments have investigated these questions using the
public goods game paradigm. While their results jointly support the notion
that an empirical link between the cognitive system and the choice to cooperate
exists, the direction of the link remains disputed. Rand et al. (2012), for exam-
ple, find that higher contributions in standard public good games are related
to intuitive decision making. Tingho¨g et al. (2013) fail to replicate this result,
as do Duffy and Smith (2012) using a cognitive load design. In the closely re-
lated context of general fairness preferences, Piovesan and Wengstro¨m (2009)
conclude that more generous allocations in dictator games are associated with
deliberation. Again, Schulz et al. (2012) find the opposite using a different de-
sign. In sum, therefore, the question of how intuition and deliberation relate to
cooperative behavior is far from settled.
The present paper brings new empirical evidence from outside the laboratory
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to bear on the question of a link between cognitive systems and contribution
behavior. Methodologically, it follows the common strategy of identifying the
cognitive system through response time data (Piovesan and Wengstro¨m, 2009;
Rand et al., 2012; Tingho¨g et al., 2013; Nielsen et al., 2014). This strategy relies
on the fact that on average, response times (RT) differ between intuitive and
deliberative processes. When considering the consequences of a given choice
or resolving a moral dilemma, faster decisions are more likely to be the result
of intuitive processes while slower decisions are more likely to have involved
deliberative reasoning (Rubinstein, 2007, 2013).
The RT data in this paper originates from an extra-laboratory experiment
(Charness et al., 2013) run via the internet. There, subjects from the general
population faced a choice between receiving a monetary payment or contributing
to a real world public good. The real public good exploits the behaviorally rich
setting of voluntary actions against climate change (Gowdy, 2008) and takes the
form of a guaranteed and verifiable reduction of CO2 emissions by one metric
ton (Diederich and Goeschl, 2013). The public goods nature of such a reduc-
tion is not only well understood by economists (Nordhaus, 1991), but also by
the subjects of the experiment.1 This unique dataset of RT observations offers
four distinct benefits: First, it is to our knowledge the first set of observations
to allow a test of the link between cognitive system and contributions using
a real public good. Secondly, with 3483 subjects participating, the number of
independent observations is large compared to most datasets that examine this
link. This is important in light of Rubinstein’s (2007, 2013) dictum that the
noisy approximation of mental processes through RT data requires large sample
evidence. Third observing a representative sample of subjects from the general
population with a broad range of demographic backgrounds increases the gen-
eralisability of our results. Fourth the dataset contains two RT observations
per subject: Each subject took two choices between different monetary rewards
and a public good. Hence, as in Piovesan and Wengstro¨m (2009), it is possible
to analyze the within-subject relationship between response times and contri-
butions while holding constant unobserved individual attributes or preferences,
thus going beyond simple correlation.
Our results are threefold: First, we find a clear difference between contribu-
tion decisions depending on whether they are based on intuitive or on deliber-
ative processes. This finding confirms the existing literature that has detected
a link between cognitive systems and contribution decisions. Secondly, we find
that intuitive decisions are statistically associated with a choice not to contribute
to the public good while a choice to contribute is more likely to be observed
when the decision is deliberative. This result lends support to earlier find-
ings (Piovesan and Wengstro¨m, 2009) that find deliberative processes to favor
pro-social choices. In the extra-laboratory experiment that we report on, this
effect stands out clearly: The average response time of contributors, controlling
1The questionnaire administered to subjects as part of the experiment bears this out. This
is unsurprising in light of the fact that German citizens almost universally accept both the
empirical veracity of climate change and that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are its
cause (European Commission, 2008).
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for other factors, is approximately 40% longer than that of non-contributors.
Thirdly, this finding carries over to the individual level. Subjects that switch
from free riding in their first decision to contributing in their second decision
need significantly more time for their second decision and vice versa. We inter-
pret this as evidence in support of the hypothesis that voluntary contributions
to the real public good are driven by a deliberative weighting of personal costs
and social benefits rather than by affect and intuition. We summarize the ex-
perimental procedure in section 2 and present and discuss the results in section
3 before concluding.
2 Experimental Procedures
The RT data analyzed here were collected in the context of an incentivized online
experiment. In this experiment, subjects made two consecutive choices, deciding
each time between receiving a personal monetary reward and providing a real
public good. The real public good took the form of a guaranteed and verifiable
reduction of 1 metric ton of CO2 emissions.
2 From session to session, there
were slight variations in the terms of the emissions reduction while retaining
the basic design of personal gain versus public goods contribution.3
The treatment condition in the online experiment consisted of randomly as-
signing subjects to different monetary rewards. For each subject and choice, the
reward was independently drawn from a uniform distribution of even integers
between e2 and e100.4 As a result, the data set contains significant between-
subjects and within-subject variation with respect to the decision. This varia-
tion forms the basis of robustness checks, among them a check for the hypothesis
that RT is determined by the degree of cognitive difficulty of a decision situa-
tion, rather than the cognitive system used (Krajbich et al., 2010; Evans et al.,
2014).
The experiment ran between May and July 2010 drawing on a panel of 65,000
members of a large online polling organization. The recruitment of the subjects
followed the standard routine in which panel members are invited via an E-mail
message to proceed to the poll via a hypertext link. The introductory screen
then explained, as common with the pollster’s regular surveys, the thematic
focus of the poll, the expected duration (ten minutes), and the random incentive
2Choices were implemented under a random incentive system (RIS) (Grether and Plott,
1979; Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Lee, 2008). The RIS is between-subjects (BS) (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981; Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Baltussen et al., 2012) with odds of one in fifty that
the subject’s choice (of either cash or contribution) was realized. This payment procedure
decreases overall expected earnings to each subject but ensures that the conditional choice
between the two options remained at face value.
3There were four variations in total. For example, in some sessions, a contribution deci-
sion was made public after the session. Session effects are therefore explicitly included when
analyzing pooled data in section 3. The main relationship between response times and con-
tribution behavior is unaffected by the different variations. We therefore pool the data from
the different sessions.
4For each of the 50 reward categories, there are between 56 and 83 observations.
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system.5 Participants then faced a sequence of 10 to 13 computer screens, two of
which were “decision screens” that required a choice between personal monetary
payoff and public good contribution. Both decision screens were each preceded
by an information screen that introduced the choice situation and the emissions
reduction.
The RT data for the present analysis contain, for each of the 3483 subjects,
a measure of the time the subject spent on each of the two “decision screens”
that were the core of the experiment. Each decision screen presented, through
radio buttons, the binary choice between the public goods contribution (”reduc-
tion in CO2 emissions of 1 metric ton”) and the specific monetary reward (e.g.
”e46”) that had been drawn for the subject in this round, with the order of
the cash and contribution button randomly assigned. There was no default and
subjects clicked on the desired radio button and on a ’proceed’ button directly
underneath. For each decision screen, a subject’s RT is defined as the time
between entering that decision screen and clicking on the ’proceed’ button. The
3483 subjects are a representative sample of the Internet using population of
Germany with respect to sex, age, and federal state of residence.6
3 Results
3.1 Response times and behavior
The recent experimental literature hypothesizes that a link exists between an
observed contribution decision and the time it took to reach that decision, thus
revealing the decision system responsible. For a first look at the data, we follow
Rubinstein (2007, 2013) and Piovesan and Wengstro¨m (2009) and classify each
decision into one of four categories according to its percentile in the RT distri-
butions: very fast (fastest 10%), fast (10%-50%), slow (50% - 90%) and very
slow (slowest 10%). Table 1 summarizes, for each of the decision screens, the
descriptive statistics of the four RT categories and the associated contribution
behavior.
It is evident that RTs vary substantially between the four categories. At the
first decision screen (Decision 1), subjects in the fastest category responded on
average within 4 seconds, while subjects in the slowest category took more than
5The polling company usually incentivizes panel members participating in a poll through
either a piece-rate reward of approximately e1 for 20 minutes expected survey time or random
(lottery) prizes, e.g. in the form of shopping vouchers.
6Compared to the full set of subjects who finished the experiment, we exclude observations
with missing values in one or more of the variables. Also, as the data are collected online,
it is possible that subjects leave the computer during the experiment and complete their
decision form much later. As for these subjects the recorded response time potentially does
not coincide with the length of the decision process we exclude all subjects that spent more
than 300 seconds on the decision screen from the analysis. The largest RT we exclude is 75
minutes. All major results we present in section 3 are independent from this cutoff criterion.
As a robustness check we test this for alternative cutoffs of 60, 120, 180, 240, and 500 sec.
With a cutoff of 300 seconds, not more than 20 observations (amounting to 0.3 percent of all
complete observations) are excluded from the analysis.
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1 minute. At the second decision screen (Decision 2), average RTs are similar,
but hint at a slight acceleration of decision-making relative to decision 1.
Decision 1
Category Reaction Time (Sec.) Fraction of Contributors
N Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Very Fast 349 4.17 (0.906) 0.088 (0.284)
Fast 1393 10.01 (2.694) 0.128 (0.334)
Slow 1393 26.06 (8.163) 0.203 (0.403)
Very Slow 349 70.02 (31.947) 0.347 (0.476)
Decision 2
Category Reaction Time (Sec.) Fraction of Contributors
N Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
Very Fast 349 4.13 (1.071) 0.140 (0.347)
Fast 1393 10.36 (2.684) 0.234 (0.423)
Slow 1393 24.81 (7.516) 0.234 (0.423)
Very Slow 349 65.67 (34.566) 0.300 (0.459)
Table 1: Categorization of reaction times
Table 1 also reports, for each RT category, the share of contributors. On
average 17 percent of subjects chose to contribute in decision 1, 23 percent in
decision 2. Comparing, for each decision situation, the share of contributors
across the four RT categories, we find a positive relationship between reaction
time and contributions that is confirmed by statistical tests. In decision 1, there
are significant differences in contribution behavior between all RT categories
(Chi2-Test: Pairwise comparisons, p < 0.05). The difference is most pronounced
between the fastest and the slowest group of subjects (Chi2-Test: p = 0.000,
χ2 = 68.48): Among the fastest, only 8.8 percent choose to contribute to the
public good while among the slowest, a little more than 34 percent of subjects do
so. The relationship between RTs and contributions gets weaker in the second
decision, as Table 1 shows. The difference between the fastest and the slowest
group of subjects (14.0% of contributors vs. 30.0% of contributors) remains
highly significant (Chi2-Test: p = 0.000, χ2 = 26.12). A pairwise comparison of
the groups ’Fast’ and ’Slow’, however, does not yield a significant difference in
contribution behavior (Chi2-Test: p = 0.973, χ2 = 0.0012).7
To sum up, basic tests of correlation between RT categories and average
contribution shares within each category are supportive of the hypothesis that
faster, more intuitive decisions are associated with a lower probability of con-
tributing while slower, more deliberative decisions are associated with a higher
probability. The correlation is strong when subjects encounter the choice for the
7We show below that part of this moderation can be attributed to those subjects who
contribute in the first decision and do not change their behavior in the second decision.
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first time and somewhat attenuated when the contribution choice is presented
a second time, with different trade-offs.
3.2 Robustness Checks
3.2.1 Categorization
Correlation tests that compare average contribution shares across categories can
be sensitive to the method of categorization. The categorization in 3.1 relies on
threshold values for the 10th, the 50th, and the 90th RT deciles as introduced
by Rubinstein (2007, 2013) and Piovesan and Wengstro¨m (2009). Conceivably,
a different choice of thresholds between categories could find different results.
Figure 1: CDF of response times separate for contributors and freeriders
To check for robustness to categorization choice, we examine the entire cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of RTs for contributors and non-contributors
(Rubinstein, 2013) and find that the results do not depend on the specific cat-
egorization. For both decision 1 and 2, figure 1 shows two CDFs of deciding
within t seconds, one for contributors C(t) (grey dashed line) and one for those
choosing cash F (t) (black solid line). Inspecting the CDFs for decision 1, C(t)
is consistently to the right of F (t) over the full range of observed response times
(t). This first-order stochastic dominance represents clear evidence (Rubinstein,
2013) that it takes longer for subjects to contribute than to free-ride or - con-
versely - that deliberate decisions are consistently more likely to result in a
contribution decision than intuitive decisions8. Inspecting the CDFs for deci-
sion 2, free-riding again stochastically dominates contributing, but the difference
8A CDF C(t) of the action c is said to stochastically dominate a CDF F (t) of the action f
if F (t) ≥ C(t)∀t
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between the CDFs is smaller. This indicates that the relationship between RTs
and contributions, while still present, is weaker in the second decision.
3.2.2 Individual Heterogeneity
RTs are a noisy proxy for identifying intuitive and deliberative decision systems
(Rubinstein, 2007, 2013). The present experiment responds to the resultant
sample size requirement with observations from almost 3500 subjects. However,
this large subject pool is highly diverse in terms of its demographic background
and is exposed to variations in price and contribution characteristics within
the experiment. This requires refining the simple analysis above in order to
check whether differences in RTs are perhaps driven by differences in certain
subject characteristics (such as age) and treatment conditions (such as a high
price) rather than differences in the use of decision systems. Table 2 reports
the results of a multivariate OLS regression analysis of RT data in which we
control for the presence of potential confounding factors in subjects’ decision 1.
Table 3 reports the same for decision 2. Summarizing ahead of a more detailed
discussion, the positive relationship between RT and contribution behavior turns
out to be robust to the potential confounds examined here.
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(RT1) Ln(RT1) Ln(RT1)
Contributor (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.393**** (11.02) 0.371**** (10.34) 0.306**** (8.96)
Price (Euro) 0.0000192 (0.04) -0.000126 (-0.27) -0.000346 (-0.80)
Age (Years) 0.00627**** (6.57) 0.00495**** (5.46)
Education (Cat. 1-11) -0.0146** (-2.15) -0.0123* (-1.92)
Income (Cat. 1-11) -0.0204**** (-3.75) -0.0168*** (-3.26)
Female (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.0283 (-1.03) -0.0274 (-1.05)
Time Introduction Screen (Sec.) 0.0000118 (0.35) -0.000266** (-1.96)
Time Information Screen (Sec.) 0.000358**** (4.88) 0.00699**** (21.53)
Personal Benefit (Cat. 1- 4) -0.0483*** (-2.67) -0.0327* (-1.92)
Next Generation Benefit (Cat. 1- 4) 0.0768**** (4.20) 0.0550*** (3.18)
Constant 2.617**** (83.37) 2.440**** (29.00) 2.294**** (28.58)
Observations 3483 3483 3456
R2 0.053 0.081 0.185
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
session dummies included.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 2: Decision 1: Regression of reaction times on contribution dummy and
demographic covariates.
For decision 1, table 2 reports the regression results for three different specifi-
cations. Specification (1) regresses the logarithm of reaction time9 as a function
of the binary contribution decision and the treatment conditions under which
the decision was taken. These conditions are given by the monetary reward
9As the distribution of reaction times is close to an exponential distribution, a logarithmic
transformation is applied to normalize the dependent variable and give less weight to obser-
vations with large decision times. The results presented here hold also with untransformed
variables.
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(price) that subjects forewent when choosing to contribute and one of four vari-
ations of the public good characteristics. An inspection of the coefficient for the
contribution variable shows that a contributor took on average approximately
40 percent more time to reach a decision than a non-contributor.
Specification (2) adds demographic controls to the analysis, but finds little
change in the fundamental relationship between RTs and contribution behav-
ior. As expected, RT increases with age and decreases with education status
and income. To proxy for individual variations in general reading and computer
handling speed, we use the time spent on the relatively text-intensive introduc-
tion screen of the experiment, but find no evidence of a significant relationship
with the RT at the decision screen. As a further control variable, we also use the
time spent on the information screen. Since this screen contained some details
that would become actionable on the decision screen, subjects could conceiv-
ably start the decision process before reaching the decision screen, resulting in
a negative correlation with our RT measure. Testing this possibility, we indeed
find a significant relationship, but it is both quantitatively small10 and works in
the opposite direction: Subjects who spent more time on the information screen
tend to also spend more time on the actual decision screen.11
Specification (2) also includes two variables from the post experimental sur-
vey measuring subjects’ attitudes regarding the benefits of CO2 reductions for
themselves and for future generations. We find that these variables relate to RT
in a significant way. The relationship mirrors the observed relationship between
RTs and the decision to contribute: RT decreases with the strength with which
subjects believe that a contribution generates personal benefits, but increases
with the strength with which subjects believe that a contribution generates ben-
efits to the next generation. In other words, the more a subject believes that the
consequences of the decision affect others, the more likely it is that deliberative
processes are involved in the decision.
Specification (3) checks how sensitive the coefficient estimates are to outliers.
It excludes observations that display a high leverage12 when running regression
diagnostics after specification (2). The high leverage is mainly driven by a few
observations that stand out for the long time spent on the introduction or in-
formation screen. Overall 27 observations are discarded. The main relationship
between RT and contributions is robust to this change, with an increase in
contributors’ response time of 31 percent. The coefficients for time spent on
introduction or information screen gain both in magnitude and significance.
Table 3 contains the corresponding analysis of RT data from decision 2.
10One additional second spent on the information screen increases RT by an average of 0.04
percent.
11As a further robustness check instead of controlling for the time spent on the information
screen within the regression, we use the total time spent on both information and decision
screen as a dependent variable. We still find a significant difference between contributors and
defectors. One interpretation is that subjects who are more oriented towards pro-social goals
spent more time acquiring information on how their decision could affect others. Fiedler et al.
(2013) provide evidence along these lines.
12We employ the conventional cutoff of Leverage > (2 ∗ k + 2)/N
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(1) (2)
(LN RT 2) (LN RT 2)
Contributor (1=Yes; 0=No) 0.131**** (4.38) 0.124**** (4.00)
Price (Euro) 0.00108** (2.32) 0.00106** (2.33)
Age (Years) 0.00930**** (9.90)
Education (Cat. 1-11) 0.00642 (0.98)
Income (Cat. 1-11) -0.0215**** (-4.02)
Female (1=Yes; 0=No) -0.0215 (-0.80)
Time Introduction Screen (Sec.) -0.0000538* (-1.66)
Time Information Screen (Sec.) 0.000361*** (2.71)
Personal Benefits (Cat. 1- 4) -0.125**** (-7.38)
Benefits Next Gen (Cat. 1- 4) 0.125**** (7.09)
Constant 2.605**** (135.64) 2.136**** (26.98)
Observations 3483 3483
R2 0.04 0.09
Prob> F 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
Session dummies included.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 3: Decision 2: Regression of reaction times on contribution dummy and
demographic covariates.
Specification (1) is identical to that in table 2 and reaffirms a highly significant
and positive relationship between the contribution decision and RT. In contrast
to table 2, the RT differences are now smaller, but a decision to contribute still
leads to an average increase of 13 percent in the RT. Also, decisions are slower
when a higher monetary award is at stake. Specification (2) demonstrates that
the link between RT and the second contribution decision is also robust to the
inclusion of the controls considered in the first decision.
The evidence on a positive relationship between RT and contribution de-
cision reported in table 3 contains one obvious complication: In decision 2,
subjects have already taken a decision once, have greater familiarity with the
public good offered and have seen a specific monetary award. Table 4 reports
on the results of further analysis of the link between RT and contributions that
includes behavior and prices from decision 1 and therefore explicitly accounts
for the possible dependence of decision 2 on decision 1. Again, the main result
is that the link between RT and contributions remains robust, as we explain in
detail.
Specification (1) in table 4 contains the same controls of specification (1) in
table 3, but includes robustness checks vis-a-vis decision 1. One pair of variables
captures the effect of having contributed in decision 1 and of contributing in both
decisions (through the interaction term), relative to a baseline of contributing
in neither. A second pair measures by how much the cost of contributing has
increased or decreased relative to the first decision, allowing for a possible asym-
metry in the magnitude of the response. On the contribution decision, we find
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(1) (2)
(LN RT 2) (LN RT 2)
Contributor Decision 2 (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.265**** (5.74) 0.191*** ( 3.02)
Contributor Decision 1 (1 = Yes; 0 = No) 0.189** (2.57) -0.0792* (-1.70)
Interaction(Contrib1*Contrib2) -0.407**** (-4.52)
Negative Difference Price (p2-p1<0) -0.000601 (-1.07) -0.00114* (-1.74)
Positive Difference Price (p2-p1>0) 0.00263**** (3.57) 0.00278**** (3.38)
Interaction(Neg Price Diff*Contrib2) 0.00126 (1.03)
Interaction(Positive Price Diff*Contrib2) 0.000379 (0.21)
Demographic Controls YES YES
Session Dummies YES YES
Constant 2.112**** (26.46) 2.111**** (26.21)
Observations 3483 3483
R2 0.10 0.09
Prob> F 0.000 0.000
t statistics in parentheses. Robust standard errors.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 4: Decision 2: Regression of reaction times including interaction terms
for price differences and decision 1 contribution dummy
that average RT is 26% higher for those who contribute in decision 2 for the
first time and 4.7% higher for those who contribute in both decisions 13. Ad-
hering to the same choice in decision 2 as in decision 1 is therefore associated
with lower average RT, with a slightly higher RT if decision 1 was to contribute.
For those subjects that change their choice from decision 1 to decision 2, the
average increase in RT is higher for those subjects that change from defecting
to contributing than for those that change from contributing to defecting. This
provides additional support for the general finding that the decision to free-ride
requires less deliberation. On the cost of contributing, we find that exogenously
changing the contribution cost has an asymmetric effect on RT. While increases
in contribution costs from decision 1 to decision 2 are associated with signifi-
cantly higher RTs, decreasing costs are not associated with lower RTs.
Specification (2) in table 4 examines the possibility of an interaction between
the change in price and contribution behavior in the second decision. While the
effect of an increase in the announced price of the contribution does not change
in size or significance, a falling price produces a (weakly) significant negative
effect on RT. The insignificant interaction terms show that these effects affect
contributors and non contributors in a uniform way.
3.2.3 Indecision by indifference
The result that RT and contribution behavior is linked lends support to the
conjecture that underlying decision processes matter for determining outcomes
in social dilemmas. However, there is also an alternative interpretation of our
results. Rather than reflecting the underlying decision process, RTs could simply
reflect the cognitive difficulty of coming to a binary decision when the two
13This estimate is the sum of coefficients from contribution decisions 1 and 2 minus the
coefficient of the interaction term.
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options on offer are of similar value to the subject or subjects are genuinely
indifferent. In this interpretation, those that have a strong preference for one of
the options should on average be able to make a faster decision for the preferred
option than those subjects who are close to indifference between the two options
(Krajbich et al., 2010; Evans et al., 2014).
In the context of the present experiment, the conjecture of ’indecision by
indifference’ would imply that subjects that are quoted a monetary reward that
is sufficiently close to their maximum willingness to contribute would find the
decision more difficult and therefore require more time for a decision. Those, on
the other hand, for whom the reward and the reservation price of contributing
are far apart would find it easier and be able to make a fast decision. Which
decision is easy depends, under this conjecture, on the reward: If the reward
offered is low, the decision to contribute is easy and vice versa. By implication,
the RT for contributors is predicted to be low when offered a low price and high
when offered a high price while the RT of defectors is predicted to be high for
low prices and low for high prices.
To test this prediction, we exploit the fact that in decision 1, each subject
faced a randomly drawn contribution cost in the range of e2 to 100. Given
this random assignment, the testable hypothesis is that all other things equal,
contributors should be faster than free-riders at the lower end of the range while
free-riders should be faster than contributors at the upper end of the range. We
implement this test by running specification (2) of the multivariate regression
model (table 2) separately for five equally spaced subsets of the reward range be-
tween e2 and 100. This provides, for each of the five reward bands, a coefficient
estimate of how the decision to contribute influences RT. As we discuss below,
the prediction that the RT coefficients of a positive contribution decision are
negative at low prices and positive at high prices, is not fulfilled. Even a weaker
prediction, namely that RT coefficients are higher for higher monetary rewards,
is not fulfilled. We therefore find no support for the conjecture of ’indecision by
indifference’.
Price Range N Coefficient (S.D.)
EUR 2-20 607 0.224 (0.0733)
EUR 20-40 713 0.409 (0.0843)
EUR 40-60 668 0.350 (0.0856)
EUR 60-80 739 0.351 (0.0831)
EUR 80-100 690 0.404 (0.0779)
Table 5: Contribution dummy coefficient for five ascending price ranges
In each of the five reward bands, there is a significantly positive relationship
between being a contributor and longer RTs. Strikingly, the effect is also quan-
titatively comparable across reward ranges. To add robustness, we re-run spec-
ification (2) (table 2), including an interaction term between the contribution
dummy and the reward variable. We find that the main effect of the contribution
dummy remains highly significant (Coeff. = 0.347; p = 0.000). The interaction
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term, predicted to be negative, is not significantly different from zero (Coeff.
=0.0004833; p=0.673). The alternative interpretation that the difficulty of the
decision situation rather than the underlying cognitive processes generates the
evidence has therefore little support in the data.
3.3 Within-subject differences
The cross-sectional evidence in section 3.1 points to a strong relationship be-
tween the decision system employed and contribution behavior. On average,
subjects that are more likely to be relying on intuitive processes choose the
monetary reward while those that are more likely to be relying on deliberative
processes choose to contribute to the public good. This finding holds irrespec-
tive of RT categorization and controlling for a variety of confounds. The finding
can also not be explained by variations in RT resulting from ’indecision by indif-
ference’. Cross-sectional evidence, however, cannot rule out the possibility that
the identified correlation is driven by unobserved individual characteristics.
We address the possible role of unobserved individual characteristics in the
link between decision system and contribution choice by exploiting the fact that
the online experiment recorded for each subject two consecutive contribution
decisions and the corresponding RTs. As all characteristics (observed and un-
observed) are constant for the same individual, a within-subject change in RT
that is related to a within-subject change in contribution behavior would provide
strong evidence for the existence of a true relationship.
As a first step, table 6 compares the changes in decision times for those
428 subjects (12%) who change their contribution decision from decision 1 to
decision 2 with those subjects who do not. The results shows that we can recover
the cross-sectional correlation between contribution decision and RTs also at the
individual level: Subjects that switch from contributing to free-riding require on
average 4.20 seconds less time for their second choice. In contrast, subjects that
switch from free-riding to contributing require on average 1.52 seconds more to
come to that decision. The difference is (weakly) significant at the ten percent
level (Man-Whitney-Test: p = 0.072).
Decision 1 Decision 2 RT2 - RT1 Observation
Contributor Defector -4.20 117
Defector Contributor 1.52 309
No switch -0.889 3057
Table 6: Switching behavior and reaction times
Table 7 presents the results of an analysis with full controls for changes in
the incentive structure at the subject level. There, we estimate the effect of
changing contribution behavior on reaction time in a first-difference estimation
framework. This within-subject framework captures the potential effects of all
time varying factors during the experiment while eliminating potential biases
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due to observed and unobserved individual time-constant characteristics. Spec-
ification (1) reports the coefficient estimates for regressing a change in RT on
a change in contribution behavior and a change in price. Table 7 shows that
on average, the same subject takes 8.2% more time for a contribution decision
than for a free-riding decision, compared to a baseline of subjects that do not
change their contribution behavior. Changing the monetary reward does not
affect a change in reaction times. Under the premise that this analysis includes
all time-varying factors between the two decisions,14 this evidence can be re-
stated to say that on average, more deliberative decision-making leads to more
cooperative behavior.
(1) (2)
OLS IV
First Diff. Contrib. (contrib2 - contrib1) 0.0822** (1.99) 0.423** (2.11)
First Diff. Price (p2 - p1) 0.0000863 (0.23)
Constant -0.0366** (-1.98)
Observations 3483 3483
R2 0.10 -
Prob> F 0.000 0.0350
t statistics in parentheses; session dummies included.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, **** p < 0.001
Table 7: Decision Times First Difference Equation
As an additional robustness check, specification (2) accounts for the possible
omission of unobserved time varying factors that conceivably bias the results
of specification (1). The strategy is to employ an IV estimation framework
in which the exogenous variation in the monetary rewards through random
assignment is used as a instrument for changes in the contribution behavior. The
randomly drawn rewards are uncorrelated with any unobserved time-varying
factors and, under the validity of the exclusion restriction, valid instruments by
design (Smith, 2013).15 In this framework, the coefficient estimate reports a
positive within-subjects relationship between switching to cooperation and RT
that confirms the previous results at the individual level.
4 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we examined evidence from an online experiment in which subjects
faced two consecutive decisions between a monetary reward and a real public
good contribution, and where response time data is available for each decision.
This allows the evidence to speak to a current discussion on the link between
cognitive systems and cooperative behavior that exploits response times as an
14Potential candidates for unobserved time-varying factors could be boredom or fatigue by
the subjects. Their role can be considered minor in light of the fact that the median subject
completed the experiment within 6 minutes.
15The first stage regression F statistic returns F = 28.60. This indicates that the instru-
ments are not weak.
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observable proxy for cognitive processes. One strand in this discussion holds
that in social dilemma situations in which the decision to cooperate is costly for
individuals, subjects employing intuitive processes are more likely to cooperate
while those employing deliberative processes are more likely to act selfishly
(e.g.Rand et al. 2012, 2014; Zaki and Mitchell, 2013; Nielsen et al. 2014). The
evidence used to support this claim comes from experimental studies, some of
them involving the exogenous application of time pressure. While some fail to
replicate these findings (Tingho¨g et al., 2013), another strand in the discussion
arrives at the opposite conclusion: In dictator games, cooperative behavior
is associated with deliberative reasoning, and selfish behavior with intuitive
processes (Piovesan and Wengstro¨m, 2009; Fiedler et al., 2013).16
The context of the online experiment analyzed here is ostensibly one of
public goods. Yet, the results fall squarely into the second strand: We find
that cooperative behavior in an online experiment on contributions to a real
public good is associated with deliberative processes, both at the cross-sectional
level and at the individual level. There are at last two explanations for this.
One reason are design differences: Suter and Hertwig (2011) highlight that the
decision context is essential for triggering different mental processes. This is
one explanation why the correlation between behavior in the standard public
good game and contribution towards real public goods is modest (Laury and
Taylor, 2008) to non-existent (Voors et al., 2012), depending on the kind and
context of the real public good offered to experimental subjects. The real public
good used in the present experiment differs from public good contributions in
standard experiments along several important dimensions. The marginal per
capita return (MPCR) for climate protection is low on account of the large
number of potential beneficiaries and the temporal structure of climate change.
This leads to second candidate explanation. Subjects in a standard public
goods game face strategic uncertainty (e.g. Gangadharan and Nemes, 2009) as
their own payoff depends on the strategic behavior of others. Subjects in our
experiment have complete control over their own monetary payoff. This means
that the appropriate experimental paradigm among laboratory experiments to
compare our results to may well turn out to be the standard dictator game
experiment where the dictator’s private return of contributing a token is zero.
This makes our findings consistent with this part of the literature.
To conclude, this paper establishes a robust relationship between reaction
times, deliberative and intuitive decision making and contributions to a real
public good. As such, it adds to the emerging evidence base that the list of
factors that determine behavior in social dilemmas may have to be expanded
to include participants’ decision system. To the economist, who has tradition-
ally focused on outcomes rather than underlying decision processes, our finding
raises the question to what degree observed preferences of the same individual
depend on extraneous factors that favor either one of the decision systems. In
contexts such as the present one, decision environments that favor a reliance
on intuition will result in lower levels of observed contributions compared to
16For a deviating result, see Schulz et al. (2012)
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decision environments that favor a reliance on deliberative reasoning. Thus,
our findings strengthen recent developments towards an increased conscious-
ness about controlling for the presence of different decision environments and
for thinking about their active design.
Furthermore for those interested in the question, if the willingness to co-
operate is ingrained in human biology or rather driven by cultural evolution
our results are in line with the ’social brain’ hypothesis (Dunbar, 2003). In-
tuitive processes rely on older parts of the brain in evolutionary terms, while
deliberative processes rely on parts of the brain that are of much more recent
evolutionary origin (Evans, 2008; Rakic, 2009). Findings such as ours can be
seen as support for the idea that brain physiology and societal institutions have
to be understood in co-evolutionary terms.
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